Abstract Probability, the simple number and represent chance of occurrence of certain event in the future, is a tool that aids decision making for a very long time. For many decades that studies of people choice focus on probability and even name it as benchmark for rational decision. However, in late 1970, many researchers started to question its whether it is possible to calculate exact number that represents chance of occurrence in reality. The most influent paper which bring this curiosity of imprecise probability into public is the papers of Daniel Ellsberg and his colour ball lottery. In this paper we will investigate on how people respond to imprecise probabilities base on Ellsberg paradox in more realistic control in order to exclud...
This paper investigates the possibility of a frequentist interpretation of imprecise probabilities, ...
International audienceDo individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type...
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp ...
What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the...
Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational cho...
This paper argues that the similarities between Ellsberg’s and Shackle’s frameworks for discussing t...
As scientists and as technologists we should discard the idea of a ‘true’ or ‘objective’ probability...
Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by...
In this article we demonstrate how algorithmic probability theory is applied to situations that inv...
This paper argues that the similarities between Ellsberg's and Shackle's frameworks for discussing t...
Information about event probability upon which decisions depend may be more or less precise. The fir...
We present a simple model where preferences with complexity aversion, rather than ambiguity aversion...
URL des Cahiers :http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/MSEFramCahier2005.htmCahiers de la Maison des Sciences Ec...
This paper addresses the problem of constructing subjective imprecise probabilities using qualitativ...
Since von Neuman and Morgenstern's (1944) contribution to game theory, the expected utility criterio...
This paper investigates the possibility of a frequentist interpretation of imprecise probabilities, ...
International audienceDo individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type...
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp ...
What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the...
Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational cho...
This paper argues that the similarities between Ellsberg’s and Shackle’s frameworks for discussing t...
As scientists and as technologists we should discard the idea of a ‘true’ or ‘objective’ probability...
Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by...
In this article we demonstrate how algorithmic probability theory is applied to situations that inv...
This paper argues that the similarities between Ellsberg's and Shackle's frameworks for discussing t...
Information about event probability upon which decisions depend may be more or less precise. The fir...
We present a simple model where preferences with complexity aversion, rather than ambiguity aversion...
URL des Cahiers :http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/MSEFramCahier2005.htmCahiers de la Maison des Sciences Ec...
This paper addresses the problem of constructing subjective imprecise probabilities using qualitativ...
Since von Neuman and Morgenstern's (1944) contribution to game theory, the expected utility criterio...
This paper investigates the possibility of a frequentist interpretation of imprecise probabilities, ...
International audienceDo individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type...
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp ...