The paper proposes a formalization of rational agents as first-order consistent formal systems. On this basis we build a notion of common knowledge and common rationality, among agents who are globally inconsistent with each other. An existence theorem for a formal system of common rationality is provided
A Paraconsistent Provability Logic is presented, developed inside a suitable sequent-formulated syst...
We describe economic agents as formal logical systems of the first order, and then able to show that...
Bibliography: p. 121-125.xiv, 125 p. ; 30 cm.One of the central issues in Artificial Intelligence (A...
In this paper, we give a logic system — W based on the view of shared common knowledge, and prove so...
The study of intelligent agents capable of rational as well as social behaviour has received an incr...
This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual ...
Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspire...
We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that attach a rational numb...
The paper axiomatizes individual and common belief by means of modal propositional logic systems of ...
The paper investigates the relations between iterate and fixed-point accounts of common belief and c...
In order to succeed, agents playing games must reason about the mechanics of the game, the strategie...
This paper substitutes the standard rationality assumption with approximate rationality in normal fo...
We study the strategic impact of players’ higher-order uncertainty over the observability of actions...
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priorsand ...
Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all p...
A Paraconsistent Provability Logic is presented, developed inside a suitable sequent-formulated syst...
We describe economic agents as formal logical systems of the first order, and then able to show that...
Bibliography: p. 121-125.xiv, 125 p. ; 30 cm.One of the central issues in Artificial Intelligence (A...
In this paper, we give a logic system — W based on the view of shared common knowledge, and prove so...
The study of intelligent agents capable of rational as well as social behaviour has received an incr...
This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual ...
Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspire...
We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that attach a rational numb...
The paper axiomatizes individual and common belief by means of modal propositional logic systems of ...
The paper investigates the relations between iterate and fixed-point accounts of common belief and c...
In order to succeed, agents playing games must reason about the mechanics of the game, the strategie...
This paper substitutes the standard rationality assumption with approximate rationality in normal fo...
We study the strategic impact of players’ higher-order uncertainty over the observability of actions...
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priorsand ...
Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all p...
A Paraconsistent Provability Logic is presented, developed inside a suitable sequent-formulated syst...
We describe economic agents as formal logical systems of the first order, and then able to show that...
Bibliography: p. 121-125.xiv, 125 p. ; 30 cm.One of the central issues in Artificial Intelligence (A...
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