The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show t...
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determine...
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determine...
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor g...
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor g...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is ...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
This article analyses how the degree of product differentiation, the size of the cartel and the size...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If ...
We study cartel stability when firms maintain collusion only if it is more profitable than competiti...
The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It weighs t...
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show t...
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determine...
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determine...
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor g...
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor g...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is ...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
This article analyses how the degree of product differentiation, the size of the cartel and the size...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If ...
We study cartel stability when firms maintain collusion only if it is more profitable than competiti...
The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It weighs t...
This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show ...
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show t...
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