Could a regulated market approach for rhinoceros horns work in South Africa? Some practical issues and concerns

Publisher versionOne of the proposals for fighting rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and adopt a regulated market approach (RMA), which would require a vote at the 2016 CITES meeting in order to overturn the ban on the trade in rhino horn. The legal trade in rhino horn would enable the auctioning of stockpiles of horn and encourage captive breeding programmes. The aim of increasing the supply of horn is to reduce incentives to poach by driving down the price. This paper uses a conceptual/theoretical approach to consider the practical implications of the adoption of an RMA, drawing on demand, supply and production theory. The intention is explicitly to set out some practical concerns and issues that seem to have been underplayed or neglected in most published economic discourse on the subject. To secure a stockpile for some species needs biological success in captive breeding programs (CBPs) but this varies across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need relatively spatially extensive terrain and costly permanent security measures, and only appear feasible for the less aggressive “white” rhino. Thus, market price would actually need to be sustained at a high level to cover the start-up and security costs of such a programme that are unlikely to fall significantly. This is a double-edged sword in that the persistent high price of rhino horn provides an incentive for continued poaching activities. Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups may also prove necessary