Fundamental results in the theory of extensive form games have singled out the reduced normal form as the key representation of a game in terms of strategic equivalence. In a precise sense, the reduced normal form contains all strategically relevant information. This note shows that a difficulty with the concept has been overlooked so far: given a reduced normal form alone, it may be impossible to reconstruct the game’s extensive form representation
This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the ...
Abstract. This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium th...
We analyze what can be inferred about a game's information structure solely from the probability dis...
This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in ext...
In this paper we show that an invariant solution for normal form games can be extended uniquely to a...
Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent be...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
The objective of this paper is to present a new representation for games with more than two players....
Sudhölter P, Rosenmüller J. The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation. W...
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players — allowing players to be imper...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the ...
This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the ...
Abstract. This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium th...
We analyze what can be inferred about a game's information structure solely from the probability dis...
This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in ext...
In this paper we show that an invariant solution for normal form games can be extended uniquely to a...
Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent be...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
The objective of this paper is to present a new representation for games with more than two players....
Sudhölter P, Rosenmüller J. The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation. W...
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players — allowing players to be imper...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the ...
This book has grown out of a decade and a half of joint research that resultedin the ...
Abstract. This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium th...
We analyze what can be inferred about a game's information structure solely from the probability dis...