Audit fees and asset securitization risks

The thesis investigates “where were the auditors in asset securitizations”, a criticism of the audit profession before and after the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC). Asset securitizations increase audit complexity and audit risks, which are expected to increase audit fees. Using US bank holding company data from 2003 to 2009, this study examines the association between asset securitization risks and audit fees, and its changes during the global financial crisis. The main test is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, which is adapted from the Fields et al. (2004) bank audit fee model. I employ a principal components analysis to address high correlations among asset securitization risks. Individual securitization risks are also separately tested. A suite of sensitivity tests indicate the results are robust. These include model alterations, sample variations, further controls in the tests, and correcting for the securitizer self-selection problem. A partial least squares (PLS) path modelling methodology is introduced as a separate test, which allows for high intercorrelations, self-selection correction, and sequential order hypotheses in one simultaneous model. The PLS results are consistent with the main results. The study finds significant and positive associations between securitization risks and audit fees. After the commencement of the global financial crisis in 2007, there was an increased focus on the role of audits on asset securitization risks resulting from bank failures; therefore I expect that auditors would become more sensitive to bank asset securitization risks after the commencement of the crisis. I find that auditors appear to focus on different aspects of asset securitization risks during the crisis and that auditors appear to charge a GFC premium for banks. Overall, the results support the view that auditors consider asset securitization risks and market changes, and adjust their audit effort and risk considerations accordingly