This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, particularly on the understanding of the observed antisocial behaviour phenomenon between subjects around the world. The anonymous nature of contributions and punishments are taken into account to reinterpret the experimental results by analysing dynamic behaviour in terms of mean contributions across societies and their association with antisocial punishment. Thus, by also taking into account the heterogeneity between the experimented cities, the analysis contrasts with the interpretation of one trend across cities, as the findings indicate two opposite trends in different groups of cities
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitori...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, part...
We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people wh...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
This thesis is concerned with a topic in behavioral economics that is a relatively new and fast grow...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the effic...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper provides a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary...
This data set contains the results of a laboratory experiment within the framework of Public Good Ga...
This paper presents results of an experiment with Czech (and Slovak) University students replicating...
In certain economic experiments, some participants willingly pay a cost to punish peers who contribu...
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitori...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, part...
We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people wh...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
This thesis is concerned with a topic in behavioral economics that is a relatively new and fast grow...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the effic...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper provides a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary...
This data set contains the results of a laboratory experiment within the framework of Public Good Ga...
This paper presents results of an experiment with Czech (and Slovak) University students replicating...
In certain economic experiments, some participants willingly pay a cost to punish peers who contribu...
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitori...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...