Public Opinion on Automation and Globalization

Globalization and automation are transforming the international labor market. Although technological change has led to job polarization, rising income inequality, and labor displacement, many overwhelmingly blame globalization --- immigration, trade, and offshoring --- but not automation for economic dislocation. Why do some people point the finger at immigrants and workers abroad, but not robots? Which types of workers are more worried about automation, and why? A decade's worth of survey data show that people have largely positive attitudes toward technology despite its disruptions to the labor market. Most believe that technological innovations enhance our lives, make the world better off, and should continue to be prioritized. Using a nationally representative survey (chapter 2) and an online survey experiment (chapter 3) in the United States, I show that people tend to cope with employment threats from automation by displacing blame onto outgroups and demanding protectionist policies. Many believe in the fallacy that labor demand is fixed and workers compete in a zero-sum manner. With robots increasingly displacing labor, people want to stop outgroups --- immigrant and foreign workers --- from further dividing the pie. Hesitant to halt innovation, individuals opt to buffer the technological threat to domestic workers with substitute policies --- immigration and trade restrictions --- that they believe could improve national wages and employment prospects. As such, automation anxiety may have evoked individuals' protectionist instincts, intensified attempts to resist globalization, and contributed to the revival of radical politics. But not all workers are equally anxious about robots and machines. Chapter 4 leverages the household registration system in China to examine how institutions may lessen (or heighten) automation anxiety. This system creates a stratified labor market that discriminates between local and non-local workers. Drawing on data from semi-structured interviews, factory visits, and two original surveys conducted in coastal China, I find that local workers --- who are better protected by local labor regulations --- are more worried about technological displacement than non-local workers. The divergent legal-institutional environments faced by local and non-local workers influence their expectations and the availability of exit options comparable to their status quo. The undesirability of non-local workers' circumstances make their jobs less painful to lose and easier to substitute, leading to lower technological anxiety. The greater legal protection afforded to local workers makes them more expensive to hire, less competitive than non-local workers with the same skills, and more anxious about automation. These results suggest that opposition toward technology is more likely to originate from workers in relatively privileged positions (e.g. unions) with few exit options comparable to their status quo. Overall, this work contributes to the nascent but growing literature in political science on technological change, public opinion in international political economy, and labor politics.PHDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/163171/1/nicolewu_1.pd