Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto—or veto threat—has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion ...
This article examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at ...
The first chapter presents an overview of the creation of the veto power, having regard to some init...
Tsebelis ’ veto players theory predicts that legislative veto players constrain the executive’s poli...
Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlik...
Literature on bargaining within international organizations points to two potential sources of barga...
Examining Board: Professor Dr. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Profe...
Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiat...
Several reforms have taken place at the EU level to try and address the criticism that EU decision-m...
The concept of domestic veto players has become a popular explanation for foreign policy rigidity. W...
How is a veto justified? Within the discipline of International Relations, discourse analysis is gai...
The EU has famously been described as plagued by a ‘joint decision trap’: Member States are obliged ...
This paper studies the relationship between the European Parliament (EP) and the EU negotiator durin...
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent o...
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent o...
The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongl...
This article examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at ...
The first chapter presents an overview of the creation of the veto power, having regard to some init...
Tsebelis ’ veto players theory predicts that legislative veto players constrain the executive’s poli...
Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlik...
Literature on bargaining within international organizations points to two potential sources of barga...
Examining Board: Professor Dr. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Profe...
Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiat...
Several reforms have taken place at the EU level to try and address the criticism that EU decision-m...
The concept of domestic veto players has become a popular explanation for foreign policy rigidity. W...
How is a veto justified? Within the discipline of International Relations, discourse analysis is gai...
The EU has famously been described as plagued by a ‘joint decision trap’: Member States are obliged ...
This paper studies the relationship between the European Parliament (EP) and the EU negotiator durin...
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent o...
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent o...
The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongl...
This article examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at ...
The first chapter presents an overview of the creation of the veto power, having regard to some init...
Tsebelis ’ veto players theory predicts that legislative veto players constrain the executive’s poli...