Wittgenstein on grammar: the significance and authority of rules

This thesis examines the notion of ‘grammar’ and, in particular, the notion of ‘rules of grammar’ in the context of the Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Despite the prominence that the latter notion seems to have in Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice, one might doubt whether it can bear the kind of burden that Wittgenstein seems to place upon it – dissolving philosophical problems. This thesis separates out some of the reasons for doubting that ‘rules of grammar’ can be used to dissolve philosophical problems, in order to see which have a sound basis and which not. Chapter 1 presents Wittgenstein’s distinctive understanding of ‘grammar’ and its relation to philosophical problems. I present an initial simple account of ‘grammar’ and two different conceptions of Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘grammatical investigation’. Chapter 2 examines the idea that language is rule-governed. I argue that the centrality of ‘rules of grammar’ in Wittgenstein is compatible with several reservations that one might have against the idea of rule-governedness. Chapter 3 interprets Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life’. I show that the former concept stresses the importance of rules but also points to other significant aspects of our language use. The concept of ‘form of life’ brings out the importance of attending to the broader practical settings in which we pursue our linguistic and other activities. Chapter 4 outlines the phenomenon of ‘projection’. I argue that the possibility of intelligible projective uses of a word undermines the idea that the rules of grammar authoritatively decide in advance which uses of a word are meaningful. Chapter 5 discusses Wittgenstein’s understanding of nonsense and offers a view of the role that the rules of grammar play in identifying nonsense and removing philosophical problems. I also present cases that throw doubt on the persuasive power of citing such rules in philosophical disagreements. Chapter 6 examines further the role of rules of grammar in Wittgensteinian philosophical criticism. I argue that what might seem to be two substantially different views of that role are in fact very similar. On this basis, I identify several general difficulties that a Wittgensteinian critical practice faces in attempting to solve philosophical problems, but also show that such a practice can be retained. Chapter 7 points to two outstanding issues that are relevant to assessing the later Wittgenstein’s idea of a grammatical investigation