An Economic Analysis of Age At First Marriage.

This study focuses on the timing of marriage. A lifecycle model is employed to analyze the optimum age of marriage. Various economic factors are considered in the theoretical analysis. The model implies that a lower post-marriage consumption-goods price, a larger share of within-marriage public goods, and altruism tend to promote early marriage. Constraints on human capital accumulation and the greater uncertainty at early ages of the earning potential of the prospective mate tend to delay marriage. A stochastic dynamic programming model is employed to analyze the influence of income uncertainty on marriage-time decisions. The model implies that a greater variance of income delays marriage. It is also shown that the realization of the stochastic part of income influences the decision--a higher income delaying the expected age of marriage, at least in our simple context. The bargaining aspects of marriage are analyzed in a dynamic setting focusing on the age of marriage. Different assumptions about the bargaining process lead to different solutions. In particular, the leader-follower case is shown to be identical to the one person model. The collusive and leader-leader cases are also examined. The empirical work, based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, consists of two stages. First, quadratic earnings profiles are estimated in order to estimate the variance of lifetime earnings. Second, regression equations intended to explain the age of marriage are estimated. Evidence obtained supports the implications of the theoretical analysis. The incentives for early marriage are a larger share of public goods within household and cheaper post-marriage commodity prices. The financial burden of human capital accumulation, the level of education, and the uncertainty of lifetime income tend to increase the age of marriage. Exogenous forces which interrupt the search for a mate tend to increase the age of marriage by about the extent of the period of interruption. Asymmetry of expectations of income seems to increase the age of marriage.PhDEconomicsUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/160993/1/8612576.pd