Age At Marriage and Earnings in Peninsular Malaysia (Nuptiality, Demography).

A life-cycle utility maximization model of male nuptiality behavior in Malaysia is proposed. The model presents two innovations, an earnings constraint on marriage and the incorporation of social norms. The constraint is defined by earnings profiles relative to the minimum levels of living expenses necessary to support new households. The ages at which earnings appreciate to these levels determine the minimum affordable ages at marriage. A social prestige variable is included as an argument in the utility function. This variable, which incorporates social norms into the model, penalizes the male for marrying away from the mean age at marriage of his reference group. Men are nudged away from this mean age by their earnings. The theory generated two major implications for empirical modelling. The first concerns the earnings constraint. This constraint determines the minimum possible age at marriage for each male. These ages truncate the distribution of observed ages at marriage. OLS estimators are biased in the presence of this truncation. A limited dependent variable (LDV) technique is required. Secondly, the model predicts a nonlinear income effect on ages at marriage. This nonlinearity is permitted in the regression equation. The OLS and LDV estimated coefficients were found to differ substantially. In order to obtain unbiased estimates for the effects of variables on ages at marriage, the truncation should be taken into account. The earnings constraint affects the estimation. It also has a direct impact on ages at marriage. This impact varies across individuals and groups. It is stronger for urban dwellers and Malays. Overall, its impact seems to be small. Malaysia's mean age at marriage would only fall by roughly one third year if the constraint were relaxed. The impact of an Easterlin income variable was also estimated. The ratio of income to desired living expenses was used. Its effect was negative and significant. Males hasten marriage if their earnings are high relative to their desired st and ard of living. They postpone marriage if their earnings are low. The income effect was, as expected, nonlinear. Its impact was stronger for those marrying away from the mean ages at marriage.PhDEconomicsUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/160263/1/8502762.pd