Semantics and Physicalism.

There are two opposed interpretations of truth-theoretic semantic theories: a reductive, atomistic interpretation and a non-reductive, holistic interpretation. This dissertation examines the motivations and metaphysical presuppositions of these two opposed interpretations of semantic theory. Chapter one outlines the two interpretations and the metaphysical considerations which motivate the reductive account. Chapters two and three examine two of the most important arguments for the irreducibility of semantics which motivate the holistic interpretation: the argument from the permutability of reference, and the argument from the incompatibility in the "constitutive principles" of intentional theories and physical theory. In both cases I conclude that the argument is unsuccessful. Chapter four looks at arguments for the reducibility of reference to physical or functional terms and concludes that these arguments are also unconvincing. In chapter five I argue that the "token identity" strategy for reconciling irreducibility with physicalism is unsuccessful and begin developing an account of what physicalism requires. This account is more fully developed in chapter six where I argue that neither the reduction of non-physical properties to physical properties nor the reduction of all scientific theories to physical theory is required for compatibility with physicalism. I conclude that the issue of reducibility in semantics is an empirical one and that the metaphysical arguments used to motivate the reductive semantic program are misguided.PhDPhilosophyUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/160854/1/8600526.pd