We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions per player where the interaction graph is acyclic. Along the way we show PPAD-hardness for finding an $\epsilon$-fixed point of a 2D LinearFIXP instance, when $\epsilon$ is any constant less than $(\sqrt{2} - 1)/2 \approx 0.2071$. This lifts the hardness regime from polynomially small approximations in $k$-dimensions to constant approximations in two-dimensions, and our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial upper bound of $0.5$
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equil...
The exact hardness of computing a Nash equilibrium is a fundamental open question in algorithmic gam...
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, e...
We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty ac...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ?-Generali...
By proving that the problem of computing a 1=n(1)-approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete...
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equil...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the $\varepsil...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ε-Generali...
How long does it take until economic agents converge to an equilibrium? By studying the complexity o...
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equil...
The exact hardness of computing a Nash equilibrium is a fundamental open question in algorithmic gam...
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, e...
We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty ac...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatr...
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ?-Generali...
By proving that the problem of computing a 1=n(1)-approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete...
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equil...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the $\varepsil...
The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ε-Generali...
How long does it take until economic agents converge to an equilibrium? By studying the complexity o...
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equil...
The exact hardness of computing a Nash equilibrium is a fundamental open question in algorithmic gam...
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, e...