We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions imposed only on some pairs of players. Indeed, we show that pairwise mutual belief, for some pairs of players, of (i) the game payoffs, (ii) rationality, and (iii) deeming possible only strategy profiles that receive positive probability by the actual conjectures suffice for correlated rationalizability when there is a common prior. Moreover, we show that our epistemic conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief of rationality. Finally, we discuss the relationship between correlated rationalizability and Nash equilibrium on the basis of the respective pairwise epistemic conditions for each of the two concepts
We extend Aumann’s [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability, which are considerably weaker than...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (cor...
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and ...
We extend Aumann’s [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions i...
We provide epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability, which are considerably weaker than...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundati...
In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (cor...
We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and ...
We extend Aumann’s [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...