The Impact of Investor-Management Disagreement about Investment Projects on Share Repurchases

[[abstract]]最近Huang and Thakor (2013)提出一個理論性解釋去說明公司為何從事股票購回。他們主張當投資人與經營者對公司重大決策的共識很低時，公司較可能從事股票購回。本文以台灣上市公司為研究對象，探索投資人與經營者對投資案看法歧異與股票購回之關係。投資人與經營者對投資案看法歧異程度是以投資案宣告異常報酬率衡量，異常報酬率越小代表歧異程度越大。實證結果發現，投資人與經營者對投資案看法歧異程度對於股票購回有正向影響。此結果說明公司會策略性運用股票購回，使投資人與經營者對於公司重大決策的看法更趨一致。不過，在金融危機時期，此項關係並不存在。[[abstract]]Huang and Thakor (2013) propose a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases They assert that a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is lower This study explores the effect of investor-management disagreement about investment projects on stock repurchase in Taiwan Abnormal return subsequent to firm’s announcement of investment projects is employed to measure the degree of investor-management disagreement The result shows a positive relationship between measures of investor-management disagreement and stock repurchases The evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve alignment between management and shareholders However this phenomenon does not exist during the global financial crisis perio