Perks Research and Development Intensity and Corporate Performance-From the Evidence of Shenzhen B share

[[abstract]]近年來中國上市公司的董監與高管薪酬增長迅速並引起社會廣泛關注。本研究收集了2008年至2013年中國大陸深圳證交易所中的B股上市公司，研究董監與高管薪酬對研發強度以及公司績效的影響，並加入國有企業變數探討董監與高管薪酬對研發強度以及公司績效的影響，研究發現：（1）董監高管報酬、獨立董事津貼與研發強度(RD)呈顯著正相關（2）加入國有企業(SOE)變數，董監高管報酬、獨立董事津貼與研發強度(RD)呈顯著正相關，非國有公司比國有公司更願意投入研發比率（3）董監高管報酬、獨立董事津貼與公司績效沒有顯著的關係（4）加入國有企業(SOE)變數，董監高管報酬、獨立董事津貼與公司績效沒有顯著的關係，非國有公司高於國有公司績效。[[abstract]]The study investigates the influences of top executive compensation of Research and Development investment intensity and corporate performance and different effects of executive compensation on research and development investment intensity and corporate performance between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms We find that: (1) Higher executive compensation higher research and development investment intensity (2) The empirical results suggest that the non-state-owned enterprises have higher on research and development investment intensity (3) executive compensation does not impact corporate performance significantly (4) Effect of executive compensation on corporate performance is more restricted in non-state-owned firms than in state-owned firm