Incentive Compatible Insurance Guaranty Funds and Optimal Assessment Rate

[[abstract]]保險安定基金係為保障消費者權益，維持金融市場安定而設。然，對保險公司而言，安定基金之設立無異對其所承擔之保險責任提供保障，因而當保險公司與安定基金間存在資訊不對稱之情況時，保險公司可能鬆懈其自身的危險選擇與核保過程，藉以提高市場佔有率及保費收入，更可能恃安定基金之解決而從事高風險的投資行為。此謂之安定基金保護下保險者的道德風險。本文之目的，即在於利用賽局理論建構一誘因相容的安定基金制度，以期解決安定基金之存在可能引發之保險公司的道德風險問題。並藉由模型分析尋求安定基金的最適提撥方式。[[abstract]]While guaranty funds provide protection to policyholders and third-party claimants of insolvency insurers, improperly designed guaranty funds will create adverse incentives in insurance market, especially in the circumstances of information asymmetry. The existence of guaranty funds enables insurance companies, even very risky ones, to borrow form policyholders at rates that do not reflect the insurer’s default risk. Thus, insurers might engage in excessive premium writing or increased risk-taking investment. This is so-called the insurer’s moral hazard under guaranty funds. This research presents a model of incentive compatible guaranty funds to solve the above moral hazard problems. By the application of game theory, the model constructed in this research will show the determination of the optimal assessment rates applied to insurers