Evidence on the Association between Corporate Governance and Financial Distress

[[abstract]]本研究以2007 年到2010 年間，臺灣曾發生財務危機的上市、 櫃公司為研究對象，探討公司治理變數對財務危機發生可能性的 影響；及在不同財務危機類型之下，公司治理變數是否會有不同 的解釋效果。 實證結果顯示，不區分危機類型的全體模型中，董事會規模、 董監持股比率、董監質押比率與董事長兼任總經理等公司治理變 數，確實攸關企業財務危機。而掏空樣本模型分析結果顯示，董 事會規模與董監質押比率依然具有顯著正相關，但獨立董事比率 與掏空類型財務危機呈顯著負相關。而非掏空樣本模型中，董事 長不兼任總經理能顯著遏阻非掏空財務危機的發生，而董監持股 比率與董監質押比率則與全體樣本模型具有同樣顯著的解釋能力。 較特別的是，無論是否區分財務危機類型，董監質押比率均攸關 企業財務危機的發生。[[abstract]]This paper uses the samples that have financial distress of listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC (over-the-counter) companies in Taiwan during 2007 to 2010 and further separates different financial distress types from all samples We research whether governance variables will affect the probability of non-separated financial distress and have different effect under other financial distress types or not The result shows that board size directors and superior’s shareholdings shares pledge CEO duality will significantly affect the possibility of non-separated financial distress Under the financial distress of hollowing out company's assets board size and shares pledge still have significantly positive effect but independent directors show the negative effect The larger proportions of independent directors can significantly lower the financial distress’s possibility of non-hollowing out company's assets and the affect factors between CEO duality and shares pledge have the same effect under non-hollowing out company's assets and non-separated financial distress Specially shares pledge will have the same positive effect under different financial distress types and non-separated financial distres