The impact of CEO Power on the corporate convertible issuance

[[abstract]]本文以民國94年至100年間，發行可轉換公司債之台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，藉由探討可轉債發行前後之股價表現、經理人權力對轉換溢價率及轉換機率之影響。 本文研究實證發現，在可轉換公司債宣告事件期間，多數樣本累計異常報酬為負向，亦即公司宣告發行可轉換公司債會顯著壓抑公司股價。另外，發現發行可轉換公司債之公司，其累計異常報酬之走勢呈現向下趨勢，故傾向接受可轉換公司債宣告事件對投資人而言為負向訊號。 若以金融海嘯前後與經理人權力之影響而言，其結果顯示：於金融海嘯後與金融海嘯前之比較，金融海嘯後使經理人權力越具顯著。其最主要與投資人對其資訊看好看壞及經營者的心態有關。金融海嘯前，投資人並不會特別注意經理人權力及持股比例相關資訊，而在海嘯發生時期，因為有抵押債權的問題，致使投資人會於海嘯後將經理人權力及持股比例納入考量之一，以避免雷曼兄弟事件、掏空案類似案件重演。[[abstract]]This study investigate the stock performance after issuing the convertible bond and the impact of CEO power on conversion premium and conversion probability We use the listed companies in Taiwan stock market as our research sample The observation period is set between 2005 to 2011 The empirical findings indicate that during the announcement period of issuing the convertible bonds the cumulative abnormal returns are negative for most companies It shows the stock price of issuing company will be deliberately suppressed before the convertible bond announcement Moreover we find there is a downward trend of cumulative abnormal returns for those issuing companies Thus we conclude that it releases a negative signal for the convertible bond issuance announcement Comparing the impact of CEO power on the announcement effect before and after the financial tsunami event our findings show that: CEO power has becomes more decisive after the tsunami event It can be attributed to the investors’ looking bad in the future and the reason of operator’s attitude Before the financial tsunami the investor does not pay special attention to CEO power and the information of managerial ownership After the tsunami the investors will reconsider the issue of secured debts and take the CEO power and managerial ownership into account Thus like those that occurred at Lehman Brothers can be prevente