Optimal Entry Mode and Technology Transfer under Horizontal Differentiation

[[abstract]]本計劃的主要目的在於探討，跨國廠商之FDI，其產品與地主國產品的異質性，對其進入模式的選擇、其技術移轉的意願、與地主國的社會福利之影響。Porter(1990)曾指出，產品差異對跨國公司進入它國是一個重要的競爭因素；而許多實務也顯示出，跨國公司進入它國的入場模式，深受其產品異質程度之影響。例如一般認為，伺服器產業產品比個人電腦產業產品還具異質性，實際觀察顯示，個人電腦產業前三大(HP, Dell, and Acer)大多是採用購併模式(Mergers and Acqusition)進入它國市場，而伺服器產業的廠商則大多是採直接進入(Direct entry)；2004年中國最大個人電腦製造商Lenovo為了進入歐洲與美國市場，購併IBM在中國的PC部門，是最為熟悉之一例。實務案例似乎說明了一個現象：產品較異質的跨國公司比較傾向直接投資進入它國市場。這一議題，目前於既有文獻中，尚無完整的理論模型研究與論述，而正是本計劃要研究與驗證的主題之一。為了探究產品差異度的相關效應，本計劃設定了一個三階段賽局模型。第一階段，外國公司決定其進入地主國的模式(購併進入或直接設廠進入)？第二階段，外國公司選擇其移轉於地主國工廠的技術水準，愈高的技術水準轉移，一方面引發更高的移轉成本，二方面則更能降低該工廠生產階段的生產邊際成本。第三階段，外國廠商與地主國所有廠商實質生產並進行庫諾競爭。模型的設計將引入異質產品係數，如此，Mattoo(2004)的模型將成為本計劃之一特例，而此一延伸則能有效的補充Mattoo(2004)所無法觸及的前述實務現象 --“產品較異質的跨國公司比較傾向直接投資進入某一國市場＂，這議題迄今文獻上尚未有人研究。透過這樣的模型設計，本計劃預期要完成幾個研究問題。當外國跨國公司引進的產品愈為同質時，則： (1) 購併進入與直接設廠進入所帶動的最適技術移轉如何差異？ (2) 那一種進入模式會比較可能成為均衡入場模式？在何條件之下？ (3) 均衡入場模式所帶動的技術移轉是否會比非均衡模式還多？ (4) 均衡進入模式帶來的本國社會福利，其比較靜態效應如何？與非均衡模式所帶來的本國福利比較又如何？ (5) 本國政府(考慮本國福利)與跨國公司在什麼狀況下會有一致的偏好入場模式？[[abstract]]This project intends to study the effects of the product differentiation to the optimal technology transfer and the entry mode of the foreign entrants and to the host welfare. Porter (1990) claimed that product differentiation is an important competitive factor for MNEs to enter any target market. Moreover, evidences show that product differentiation affects the decision of entry mode for the MNEs. For instance, products in the Server industry are generally deemed much more differentiated than products in the PC industry. Evidence shows that in the PC industry the top three firms (HP, Dell, and Acer) enter each target market mostly by acquisition, while in the Server industry most firms enter target markets by direct entry. To give an specific example, Lenovo, the top firm in terms of PC market share in China, acquired IBM’s PC division in 2004 for entering the US and European markets. Therefore, it appears that firms with more differentiated products prefer to enter target market with direct entry mode rather than acquisition mode. To test and verify this phenomenon is not yet studied in the existing literature, and is the main concern of our project. To explore the effects of product differentiation, we set up a three-stage game model. The foreign firm chooses an entry mode (acquisition or direct entry) in the first stage, determines the level of technology transfer (which lowers its production costs at the production stage) in the second stage, and finally produces heterogeneous products and Cournot-competes with the domestic firms in the host country. This model thus extends Mattoo et al (2004) to include the issue of product differentiation. Therefore, the observed phenomenon that firms with higher differentiated products prefer to choose direct entry rather than acquisition can be effectively tested and verified, which is not yet studied. This study is expected to answer the following questions. If the foreign firm introduces less differentiated products, then: (1) Is the acquisition mode inducing less or more technology transfer than the direct-entry mode? (2) Which entry mode becomes the equilibrium entry mode and under what conditions? (3) Is the equilibrium entry mode generally inducing less or more technology transfer than the off-equilibrium mode? (4) Which entry mode leads to higher host welfare? (5) Under what conditions, do the government and the foreign firm prefer an identical entry mode?[[note]]NSC97-2410-H327-00