The relationship between BOD governance mechanism and earnings management: the moderating effect of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

[[abstract]]在博達、力霸等上市(櫃)公司爆發一連串的財務弊案前，管理當局可透過「裁決性應計項目」來操縱盈餘，對其財務報表進行窗飾並美化盈餘。公司治理及財報品質愈來愈受到市場的重視，董監事面臨的訴訟風險也愈大，使得近年來董監責任險受到我國政府、企業以及投資人的重視與探討。本文主要探討董事會規模、董監事持股質押比率、董事長兼任總經理和公司投保董監責任險與公司盈餘管理行為之間的關係。實證結果發現：1 董事會規模與公司盈餘管理存在負向的關連性。2 董監事持股質押比率與公司盈餘管理行為存在正向的關聯性。3 董事長兼任總經理與公司盈餘管理行為存在正向的關聯性，但是不顯著。4 董監責任險在財務報導上具有監督的角色，而在樣本的實證研究中，發現會抑制管理者盈餘管理的行為，因此會提升公司治理功能。[[abstract]]Before financial scandals of listed companies such as Procomp and Rebar managers can manipulate earning through the ‘discretionary accruals’ With the market paying more and more attention to corporation governance and quality of financial statement the risk of the board facing lawsuit is increasing The government the enterprises and the investors are taking D&O Insurance seriously This study examines the effects of board size the pledge of board members’ ownership CEO duality and D&O Insurance on the earnings management behavior The empirical results show: 1) the board size has negative impact on the earnings management behavior 2) the pledge of board members’ ownership have positive impact on the earnings management behavior 3) CEO duality have positive impact on the earnings management behavior but not significant 4) On the financial reporting the D&O Insurance with monitor role and in positive sample will reduce the earnings management behavior of managers to improve corporate governance function