The effect of controlling ownership structure on the agency problem and firm performance

[[abstract]]自從Jensen and Meckling在1976年發表代理理論開始，不斷有學者在公司治理面提出不同的看法，不斷被提出探討的關鍵是因股權結構而造成的代理問題。但控制股東擁有的股份以及股東間是否因擁有親屬關係造成對公司價值有所影響，對此影響的好與壞界定程度一直都是難以明確定論。本研究利用相關文獻整理公司治理變數建構出代理問題衡量指標，再從不同代理問題嚴重程度，推論股權結構中的控制股權多寡及控制股東間是否有親屬關係，對公司績效之影響程度。 研究發現，具有家族性特徵的公司類型，不論是一般或是核心代理問題均較其他公司類型來的嚴重。控制股權變數為控制代理問題的根本，實證結果顯示，若在線性關係之下，控制股權的增加，能有效抑制代理問題的增加。一般及核心代理問題愈嚴重，代理成本愈高，獲利性愈低；家族企業負債比較高；代理問題對公司成長性之影響並不顯著。[[abstract]]Since Jensen& Meckling’s agency theory was published in 1976 there have been scholars indicating different views in the area of corporate governance without ignoring the basic definition of ownership structure and how the ownership structure is caused by the agency problems Thereby the result of agency problems is affected in the presentation of the benefits of the company with the possession of kinship between the holding shareholders which would affect the value of the company As this good or bad impact is difficult to be clearly defined this study would like to discuss about the company's ownership structure when the shareholders control and whether the relationship between the shareholders thus Infer effects on corporate performance equity control This study has found that general or central agency problem of the familial type of company are serious than others types Members of the family have a controlling interest and management thus it will lead to more serious agency problems in general and central If the linear relationship in which a controlling stock is increased it can effectively inhibit the increase of agency problem