AStudyOnMoralHazardInTaiwanAutomobileInsuranceReinsuranceMarkets

[[abstract]]近年來臺灣地區各地天然災害發生的頻率持續增加，造成保險公司理賠金額巨大，故再保險業務已經成為保險市場的主流。此外，無論承保或理賠金額，汽車保險一直佔產險業最大比例的險種，也因此成為各家產險公司經營上競爭最激烈的險種。本研究目的是找出再保險市場中能夠抑制道德危險的因素。利用臺灣地區產物保險公司汽車保險為例，建立再保險市場中兩期委託代理理論找出相關的因素後，利用迴歸分析探討。研究結果發現，不論是本國或國外產險公司都可以利用監控成本去抑制原保險公司的道德危險。[[abstract]]The frequency taking place in natural catastrophe of all parts of Taiwan increases continuously in recent years cause the claims volume of insurance company to be enormous, so that the reinsurance business has already become the mainstream of the insurance market. Besides, automobile insurance is the highest-weighted among all non-life insurance industry in respect of both written premium and claim volume, which explains why automobile insurance is the most competitive one among all non-life insurance industry. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of controlling moral hazard in reinsurance markets. We take non-life insurance companies in Taiwan for example and build a multi-period principle agent model of the automobile reinsurance market to find out the relative factors, and make use of regression analysis. The empirical results provide that non-life insurance companies can make use of monitor to control moral hazard of the ceding insurance companies