The Impacts of Corporate Governance on Operating Performance Return of Common Stocks and System Risk

[[abstract]]台灣自1990年代末期本土型金融風暴發生以來，公司治理已漸為社會所重視，而公司治理目的之一，即是要極大化公司價值或股東利益，但在公司運作的過程當中，似乎有股反作用力進行對極大化過程的干擾，此即因經營權與所有權分離，所引發之權益代理問題，而經過近10年來諸多國內外學者研究，進一步發現多數企業並未如Jensen & Meckling(1976)所主張普遍存在股權分散的情形，而是許多國家及地區的企業確實存在股權集中化，因此公司治理探討的課題，即由以往經營者與所有者之權益代理問題，轉變為控制股東與小股東間之核心代理問題。 根據正的誘因效果主張，控制股東所有權愈高，愈能提升經營績效；但根據負的侵占效果認為，如果控制權偏離所有權愈大時，則愈容易引發控制股東掠奪小股東利益的動機，從而損害公司價值。易言之，所有權與控制權的分寸拿捏，其影響層面可謂錯綜複雜，欲解決代理成本問題，並非僅單一構面思維即能達成，因此本研究期望由多面向角度，同時探討股權結構、董事會特性及股份盈餘偏離程度對經營績效、股票報酬與系統風險的影響，為健全公司經營提供決策方向。 實證研究顯示：在股權結構方面，董監持股對經營績效呈正相關，對系統風險呈負相關；法人持股對經營績效之影響呈不顯著，對系統風險則呈負相關。在董事會特性方面，董監質押對經營績效、系統風險均呈現負相關；外部董監席次對經營績效、系統風險均無顯著影響。在股份盈餘偏離程度方面，盈餘分配權對經營績效呈負相關，對系統風險無顯著影響。另當一股一權偏離程度愈嚴重時，經營績效則愈差。此外，本研究之公司治理變數對股票報酬均無顯著影響。而在當期公司治理資訊的反映效率上：經營績效對法人持股(大公司)、股份盈餘偏離程度(大公司及小公司)有遲延反映現象；系統風險對公司治理變數無遲延反映現象，顯示系統風險能快速反映公司治理的資訊內涵。[[abstract]]Since the financial crisis in 1990s corporate governance has become more and more important The purpose of corporate governance is to reduce agency cost and increase the value of firm Lots of researches have shown that the firms with ultimate stockholders might have entrenched the interest of the minority stockholders on purpose This research applies two competitive theories alignment effects and entrenchment effects to investigate the relationship among the corporate governance the operating performance return of common stocks and the system risk This study covers electronics companies listing in the Taiwan stock market Empirical result shows that the more ownership directors have owned the better performance the firm will have and the lower risk the firms will take Meanwhile the higher ratio of shares hold by board of directors will decrease the firms’ value Otherwise outside directors do not play a good role on monitoring the operational performance of company Moreover the more the deviation between cash flow right and control right the worse performance firms operate Besides these variables of the corporate governance are unconcerned with return of common stocks On reflecting the effectiveness of corporate governance’s information the operational performance present a delay effect to the institutional ownership and the deviation between cash flow right and control right Finally the system risk can be rapidly response to the performance of corporate governanc