The Effects of Earnings Management on the Value Relevance of Accounting Information- A Reasearch on the Family Ownership in Taiwanenes Listed Companies

[[abstract]]本研究主要是探討國內上市櫃公司其家族企業之屬性，是否有誘因進行盈餘管理操?，且家族企業進行盈餘管理之行為，是否會影響會計資訊之價值攸關性。 實證結果顯示：(一)若上市櫃公司具有家族企業之屬性時，其進行盈餘管理程度愈低。故推論家族企業多以長期控制及經營公司為目的，具有經營權之家族股東的自身財富與公司價值產生相當程度之關聯性。而企業發展在著眼於長期利益的情況下，兼任經理人之大股東將會減少傷害公司價值及小股東之權益的不當誘因及盈餘管理行為。(二)探討家族企業核心代理問題與盈餘管理之間的關聯性，在隨著董監事質押比率增加以及股份盈餘偏離程度的擴大，家族企業進行盈餘管理的情況可能更為嚴重。故推論，家族企業成員將有誘因進行盈餘管理行為，來極大化自身利益侵害小股東之權益；然而董事會規模愈大，愈能夠發揮監督效能，使其家族企業進行盈餘管理的情況將會減少。(三) 就財務報表整體評價能力而言，當上市櫃公司為家族企業時，即使未從事盈餘管理行為，但財務資訊之價值攸關性仍不具價值性。推論原因如下：資本市場不信任家族企業所發佈之財務資訊，可能有先入為主的觀念，認為家族企業所發佈之會計訊息是不具攸關性及可靠性的；或有其他盈餘管理因素以及財務行為，會影響企業財務報表之價值攸關性表達，無法提供給投資大眾良好投資決策之參考。[[abstract]]The main objective of this study is to investigate the relationships between the earnings and the value relevance of the listed family ownership companies in Taiwan The findings show that the degree of earnings management in family firms is not statistically higher than non-family firms In other words the family ownership companies are not testifies to show higher tendency to manipulate earnings This study also shows that the interests of the family members in Taiwan are more closely linked to the firm values and also they have showed higher management engagements in the family ownership company in Taiwan The agency problems in Taiwan in many others research studies are proved to be existent in the interest conflicts problems between control shareholders and minor shareholders In our study we also show the existence of core agency problems in the family companies The managing family members will pay more attentions to integrate the long-term developments strategies into their managements which will be helpful for the reduction of company risks and logically alleviate the firm value invasion Our second result of this empirical research also shows the positive relationship between earnings management and two corporate governance variables: the stock collateralization and the deviation between cash flow right and control right Our study suggests the higher the proportion of the stock collateralization and the deviation between cash flow right and control right the higher the degree of earnings management On the other side the greater the board size of the family companies the lower the tendency to earnings management Finally we have evidenced that the value relevance of the family companies is statistical lower than that of non-family firms even though the family companies are not statistically proved to manipulate the financial statements information It is suggested that the reasons for the reduced reliability of the investors on the capital markets may be the behavioral variables for the investment decision