We give a new proof of Young's characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value is valid on various well-known subclasses of TU games
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
We present new axiomatic characterizations of five classes of TU-values, the classes of the weighted...
We define a partially consistent property for a solution of cooperative TU games, then use the consi...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first...
We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted TU-value w...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
International audienceThe classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, ...
In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which i...
Hamiache's recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states that the Shaple...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
We study the Shapley value method in solving n-person game. It is defined as a characteristic functio...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
We present new axiomatic characterizations of five classes of TU-values, the classes of the weighted...
We define a partially consistent property for a solution of cooperative TU games, then use the consi...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first...
We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted TU-value w...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
International audienceThe classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, ...
In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which i...
Hamiache's recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states that the Shaple...
It is shown that the Shapley value of any given game v is characterized by applying the value axioms...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
We study the Shapley value method in solving n-person game. It is defined as a characteristic functio...
We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in...
We present new axiomatic characterizations of five classes of TU-values, the classes of the weighted...
We define a partially consistent property for a solution of cooperative TU games, then use the consi...
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