An Analysis of Article XIX: The Safeguard Problem after the Uruguay Round

This article analyzes Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by exploring the legal requirements of safeguard measures in the GATT, and then addresses the different positions taken during the Uruguay Round by the United States, the European Community, and Developing Countries. As voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) proliferate (the terms VER [voluntary export restraint or restriction] and VRA are used synonymously in this paper), the GATT itself may weaken as more countries ignore Article XIX and take selective action. This article analyzes the need to strengthen Article XIX because of the breakdown of the so-called \u27escape clause\u27 or safeguards provisions (Article 19) of the GATT. Before addressing the ramifications of the Uruguay Round on Article XIX, it is necessary to explore the actual legal requirements of safeguard action within the GATT