Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses

This article seeks to resurrect the “causal theory”‘ of the criminal law’s excuses. While the causal theory fits some of our most important and most humane moral intuitions in a way that no other theory of the excuses does, it gets little play in current criminal theory. This article argues that criminal theory should give causal theory a second look. I. Introduction . . . . . 1117 II. Causal Theory Defined . . . . . 1119 A. The Claims Made by Causal Theory . . . . . 1120 1. The First Claim: The Excuse Accepts a “Causal Account” . . . . . 1120 2. The Second Claim: The Excuse Expresses the Control Principle . . . . . 1123 B. Causal Explanation and the Criminal Law’s Excuses . . . . . 1126 III. The Contemporary Critique . . . . . 1131 A. The “Overbroadness” Formulation . . . . . 1132 B. The Underlying Objection to “Partial Determinism” . . . . . 1133 IV. “Provisional Determinism”—A Plausible Partial Determinism . . . . . 1135 A. How the Critics Overstate the Case Against Partial Determinism . . . . . 1136 B. The Anxiety That Makes Us Partial Determinists . . . . . 1140 1. “Existential” Anxieties: Threats to Our Aspirations for Our Selves . . . . . 1140 a. Loss of “Control” . . . . . 1142 b. Loss of Stature . . . . . 1144 c. Loss of the “Self” . . . . . 1147 2. Social and Political Anxieties: Corruption of Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . 1148 a. Corruption of Social Attitudes . . . . . 1148 b. Corruption of Political Attitudes . . . . . 1150 3. Epistemic Anxieties About Causal Accounts . . . . . 1153 C. How Anxiety Makes Us Provisional—and Thus Partial—Determinists . . . . . 1155 V. Some Motivation for Revisiting Causal Theory: The Disturbing Features of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1157 A. Compatibilist Criminal Theory . . . . . 1158 B. Disturbing Features of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1162 1. The Arbitrariness of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1163 2. Artificial Criteria for Blame . . . . . 1167 3. A Morally Complacent Criminal Law . . . . . 1170 4. Unresponsive to Advances in Our Understanding of Human Behavior . . . . . 1172 5. Resistant to Criticism of Social Conditions . . . . . 1174 C. Shaking Off Compatibilism and Looking for New Alternatives . . . . . 1175 VI. Conclusion . . . . . 117