We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator applies to repeated observations of matchings among a fixed group of individuals. Our estimator is based on the stability conditions in matching models; we consider both transferable (TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) models. In both cases, the stability conditions yield moment inequalities which can be taken to the data. The preference parameters are partially identified. We consider simple illustrative examples, and also an empirical application to aggregate marriage markets
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and S...
This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided ma...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We conside...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We review recent advances in the estimation of matching models under transferable utility, with spec...
We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and S...
This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided ma...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We conside...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Abstract. This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the numbe...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...