We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a netw...
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications fo...
We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. T...
We consider a Bayesian game of pure informational externalities, in which a group of agents learn a ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Resea...
This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks...
We study a standard model of economic agents on the nodes of a social network graph who learn a bina...
Social and economic networks play an increasingly significant role in people's lives. The formation ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
We study the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of a model of learning over a general so- cial network. ...
This paper considers a model of observational learning in social networks. Every period, the agents ...
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a netw...
We study the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social net...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a netw...
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications fo...
We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. T...
We consider a Bayesian game of pure informational externalities, in which a group of agents learn a ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Resea...
This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks...
We study a standard model of economic agents on the nodes of a social network graph who learn a bina...
Social and economic networks play an increasingly significant role in people's lives. The formation ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
We study the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of a model of learning over a general so- cial network. ...
This paper considers a model of observational learning in social networks. Every period, the agents ...
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a netw...
We study the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social net...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a netw...
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications fo...
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