This chapter discusses a number of different notions of level, including levels as involving compositional relations and levels as relatively explanatorily autonomous. The notion of downward causation, understood as causation from upper to lower levels, is defended as legitimate. Downward causation is elucidated in terms of a relation called conditional causal independence: X is causally independent of Y conditional on Z when X is causally relevant (in the standard interventionist sense) to Z, Y is causally relevant to Z but conditional on the values of Z, changes in the value of X make no further difference to Y. When Y is a lower-level realizer of X and conditional independence holds, we can use Y rather than X to explain Z and t...
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between ...
The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or ...
To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circ...
This paper defends the notion of downward causation, relating it to a notion of conditional independ...
In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly intercon...
International audienceExperimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations...
No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience I show that the recent account of levels ...
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfa...
I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal relati...
This paper argues that scale-dependence of physical and biological processes offers resistance to re...
The idea of compositional levels of organization is deeply rooted into contemporary biology and its ...
Forthcoming in M. Paolini Paoletti, F. Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on D...
International audienceTwo conceptual frameworks-in terms of phase space and in terms of structural e...
Abstract: Both bottom-up and top-down causation occur in the hierarchy of structure and causation. A...
The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or ...
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between ...
The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or ...
To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circ...
This paper defends the notion of downward causation, relating it to a notion of conditional independ...
In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly intercon...
International audienceExperimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations...
No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience I show that the recent account of levels ...
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfa...
I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal relati...
This paper argues that scale-dependence of physical and biological processes offers resistance to re...
The idea of compositional levels of organization is deeply rooted into contemporary biology and its ...
Forthcoming in M. Paolini Paoletti, F. Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on D...
International audienceTwo conceptual frameworks-in terms of phase space and in terms of structural e...
Abstract: Both bottom-up and top-down causation occur in the hierarchy of structure and causation. A...
The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or ...
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between ...
The problem of downward causation – i.e., the problem of the nature of the influence of a system or ...
To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circ...