Electoral competition and legislative participation: The case of Taiwan.

This research examines the relationship between electoral competition and legislative participation in the Legislative Yuan, the national legislative body in Taiwan. Because Taiwan is a multi-member electoral system, major parties may nominate more than one candidate in an electoral district. Therefore, candidates may face both inter-party and intra-party competition. Legislative participation is conceptualized as two dimensions: the intensity of participation, measured by how much effort a legislator makes in the legislative process; and the direction of participation, measured by how close a legislator's position is to that of the party. Several major hypotheses are examined in this research. First, the greater the electoral competition--either inter-party or intra-party--that legislators face, the greater the possibility that they will engage in legislative activities, because they have to remain visible to get reelected. Secondly, the greater the inter-party competition legislators face, the more likely they are to follow their party line, because their reelection depends upon help from their parties. However, the greater the intra-party competition legislators face, the less likely they are to follow their party line, because it does not help in such a situation to advocate the party positions. Instead, they have to take positions different from the candidates of their parties to attract voters' attention. Based on a cross-sectional analysis of the legislators elected in 1992, this research tests the major hypotheses by conducting multiple regression analyses. In my analyses, I also take account of factors other than electoral competition that may affect legislative participation. These factors include the constituency's urbanization, legislators' resources, and bill salience. The research results show that legislators facing more electoral competition are more likely to participate in the legislative process. Furthermore, legislators facing more inter-party competition are more likely to follow the party line, while legislators facing more intra-party competition are more likely to deviate from the party line. These findings offer an explanation for the gradually increasing and more autonomous participation of legislators in the Legislative Yuan since the mid-1980s when Taiwan's democratization began.PhDPolitical scienceSocial SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/130120/2/9712085.pd