A cognitive-aesthetic theory of dwelling: Anchoring the discourse on the 'concept of dwelling' in Kant's Critique of Judgment.

In architectural theory, the reality of positive-subjective feelings of attachment human beings experience towards physical environments has usually been linked to the technical term dwelling, which in turn has generally been subsumed under the vague heading of phenomenology. This dissertation posits a new theory of dwelling. In doing so, it attempts to ground the reality of positive-subjective feelings of attachment to physical environments on a firmer theoretical foundation than presently afforded it in the phenomenological literature in architectural theory. Three overall claims are herein made, and they are summarized as follows. Claim one. Positive-subjective feelings of attachment to physical environments are rooted in the cognitive-aesthetic operations of the experiencing subject, as opposed to being indexed directly to specific external material forms. Hence the theory of dwelling proposed by this dissertation is called a cognitive-aesthetic theory of dwelling. In architectural theory, the extant literature on dwelling falls under the category of phenomenology, by which is largely meant the writings of Christian Norberg-Schulz. This literature implicitly tends to index positive-subjective feelings of belonging to material forms. Hence, this first claim is a critique of this position. Claim two. Kant's Critical Philosophy, because it is a philosophy which maps the geography and workings of the human cognitive apparatus, offers a way by which the positive-subjective feelings of belonging to physical places may be theoretically explained, by accessing the internal contents and workings of the experiencing subject's cognition. Claim three. Such a subject-based theory of dwelling, in addition to explaining the how and the why of the positive-subjective feelings themselves, is able to provide explanations for two other foundational questions related to the reality of material architecture. The first is why material architecture is a fact at all, and common among all human cultures and societies (as opposed to mere functional shelter). And the second is why, particularly in the West, there has been an on-going evolution of architectural stylistic change (style here meaning the visual attributes of material architecture) through history. The explanatory scope of the cognitive-aesthetic theory of dwelling herein proposed will therefore extend into areas greater than what current phenomenological theories of dwelling cover.PhDArchitectureCommunication and the ArtsPhilosophyPhilosophy, Religion and TheologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/130598/2/9732195.pd