In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations
WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 Together we ...
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, n...
In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as ob...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral ...
Stephanie Collins’ Group Duties offers interesting new arguments and brings together numerous interc...
Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more ...
It is commonplace to attribute obligations to φ or blameworthiness for φ-ing to groups even when no ...
In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: ...
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discus...
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral o...
Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which grou...
WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 Together we ...
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, n...
In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as ob...
In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-b...
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral ...
Stephanie Collins’ Group Duties offers interesting new arguments and brings together numerous interc...
Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more ...
It is commonplace to attribute obligations to φ or blameworthiness for φ-ing to groups even when no ...
In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: ...
In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discus...
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral o...
Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which grou...
WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 Together we ...
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, n...
In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of...