Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths.

In Chapter One, I offer an extended account of just what Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths asserts. I argue that the doctrine consists of five theses, all of which are integral to the doctrine. First, the eternal truths, which include the laws and truths of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics, are created by God's will. Second, the eternal truths are distinct from God's nature, just as are all other objects of God's creation. Third, God made the eternal truths innate to the human mind. Fourth, God created the essences of things. And fifth, God could have willed the eternal truths otherwise, by which Descartes means that God could have made the truth and modal status of any statement different from what it is in the actual world. In Chapter Two, I argue that Descartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths, although highly counterintuitive, is not incoherent. Descartes's eternal truths, I explain, are indeed necessary, even though they were freely created by God. As such, Descartes is not committed to it being the case that what is logically impossible is at the same time logically possible, or to any similar and absurd modal consequence. From this I conclude that Descartes's eternal truths doctrine is 'internally' coherent. I also argue that the doctrine is not 'systematically' incoherent, i.e., that Descartes does not undermine his philosophical system by advancing it. The charge that his doctrine is systematically incoherent arises from a simple misunderstanding of his view of modality and a misreading of his texts. In Chapter Three, I argue that Descartes's eternal truths doctrine is conditionally true: if there exists a simple God with a will and an intellect, then the doctrine is true. According to Descartes, divine simplicity requires that there cannot even be a rational distinction between God's essential attributes, from which it follows that acts of God's will cannot even logically presuppose acts of God's understanding. If this is the case (and I argue that it is), then God must be regarded as having created the eternal truths. In Chapter Four, I argue that Descartes was motivated to advance his eternal truths doctrine not because he thought that divine simplicity required it, but for the sake of certainty in physics. While Descartes indeed thought that divine simplicity provided a sound defense for his eternal truths doctrine, his conception of divine simplicity is not what motivated him to advance the doctrine. Instead, his desire for certainty in physics motivated him to advance the doctrine, and he was led to his novel conception of divine simplicity as a result of seeking support for his doctrine in the divine nature.Ph.D.PhilosophyPhilosophy, Religion and TheologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/126756/2/3016980.pd