Two kinds of metaphysical possibilities / Dois tipos de possibilidades metafísicas

In this article, I intend to show what the metaphysical possibility is, distinguishing it from the logical and the physical possibilities, and then to indicate that at least there is two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, i.e., the potentialities of the things and the possibilities of the events to occur. This is an important goal because it makes clearer the discussion about possibilities. To show what the metaphysical possibility is, I try to show that we need an absolute modality for the debate about what is possible do not be trivial. And to indicate that there are two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, I show that we can talk independently about these two notions of possibility, and that the debate between determinism and indeterminism presupposes such distinction. The conclusion we achieve is that there really are these two kinds of metaphysical possibilities, and that if we don’t want to be ambiguous, we have good reasons to use such distinction in our theories about the possibilities