The Problem of Eschatological Separation : Can the saved be happy in heaven, knowing about the sufferings of the lost in hell?

This thesis examines a problem regarding the separation of post-mortem persons into ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’, taken to mean two eternal and inescapable eschatological destinations for human persons: the former being an ultimate satisfaction of sorts, the latter being characterized by eternal misery. The question that is contemplated is whether the saved in heaven can experience their heavenly existence as genuinely blissful, whilst at the same time being aware of the sufferings of the lost – especially if the lost consists of one or more persons whom they love dearly, such as a close family member. Arguments given by Christian philosophers Thomas Talbott and William Lane Craig are analysed in order to establish whether the problem, referred to as ‘the problem of eschatological separation’, gives us reason to abandon the idea of an eternal hell and opt, instead, to endorse the doctrine of universal reconciliation. Talbott makes the claim that an eternal hell, considering the problem of eschatological separation, is a logical impossibility. Craig, on the other hand, puts forth two objections that he believes proves that hell is a logical possibility. Both of Craig’s objections are shown to be unsound, and the problem of eschatological separation is thus considered to be sufficient reason for rejecting the possibility of an eternal hell