Over the past few decades, an impressive body of work has developed exploring theoretical issues relating to statutory interpretation. Philosophically-informed accounts of the meaning (or, as I shall say, the linguistic content ) of statutory provisions have been proposed. Theories of legislative intent have become more sophisticated, and the sceptical challenge to the existence or utility of legislative intent has been refined in important respects. Increasingly rigorous accounts of textualism and intentionalism have been offered, as well as some robust challenges to the distinction between these two schools of thought
Statutory interpretation scholarship generally imagines a sharp divide between statutory text and le...
Statutory interpretation involves an interpreter determining the meaning of the text on the basis of...
The authors start from the assumption that the intention of the legislator is an element that the in...
In statutory interpretation, theorists have long argued that the U.S. Congress is a “they,” not an “...
Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have lingui...
This Article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two ...
Some members of the High Court have recently challenged the longstanding, fundamental principle that...
In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an important topic of academic theory ...
The principal theme of this essay is that statutory interpretation is a project that requires advoca...
This article reflects on the argument of The Nature of the Legislative Intent, replying in part to t...
Despite all that has been written about the choice between purposivist, intentionalist, and textuali...
The question of how one should interpret a statute turns at least in part on the question of what a ...
A perennial issue in the debate over legislative interpretation concerns what authority, if any, to ...
In The Nature of Legislative Intent Richard Ekins presents a theory of legislation that reaffirms th...
Textualists claim that they follow statutory text. This Article argues that, in practice, textualist...
Statutory interpretation scholarship generally imagines a sharp divide between statutory text and le...
Statutory interpretation involves an interpreter determining the meaning of the text on the basis of...
The authors start from the assumption that the intention of the legislator is an element that the in...
In statutory interpretation, theorists have long argued that the U.S. Congress is a “they,” not an “...
Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have lingui...
This Article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two ...
Some members of the High Court have recently challenged the longstanding, fundamental principle that...
In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an important topic of academic theory ...
The principal theme of this essay is that statutory interpretation is a project that requires advoca...
This article reflects on the argument of The Nature of the Legislative Intent, replying in part to t...
Despite all that has been written about the choice between purposivist, intentionalist, and textuali...
The question of how one should interpret a statute turns at least in part on the question of what a ...
A perennial issue in the debate over legislative interpretation concerns what authority, if any, to ...
In The Nature of Legislative Intent Richard Ekins presents a theory of legislation that reaffirms th...
Textualists claim that they follow statutory text. This Article argues that, in practice, textualist...
Statutory interpretation scholarship generally imagines a sharp divide between statutory text and le...
Statutory interpretation involves an interpreter determining the meaning of the text on the basis of...
The authors start from the assumption that the intention of the legislator is an element that the in...