A hybrid account of self-knowledge that integrates agency and self-interpretation

This thesis argues that certain kinds of our beliefs and desires—what I call “peripheral attitudes”—are expressions of rational agency. In addition, I argue that knowing about these kinds of states self-interpretively (on the basis of evidence, such as our thoughts, feelings and behaviour) is a feature of being a functional rational agent. I seek to account for self-knowledge—our ability to correctly identify mental states that we undergo—in a way that respects key intuitions of both the interpretationist and agentialist positions. For the agentialist, self-knowledge is importantly distinct from other-knowledge—the knowledge we have of the external world, where this includes the mental states of others. In contrast, for the interpretationist, self-knowledge is no different in kind from other-knowledge; we know our own attitudes in much the same way that we know the attitudes of others: interpretively. The agentialist charges that the need to know one’s attitudes in a third-personal way (e.g., interpretively) is a form of self-estrangement. I argue against this. I also advance a positive claim: that taking up the third-personal perspective is integral to self-knowledge; thus, we should not be so quick to relegate it to the realm of other-knowledge. I do not strictly oppose agentialism; rather, I seek to expand upon the view so as to show that an interpretationist account can in fact meet key agentialist criteria—criteria that I deem important to uphold if we want to harness what we discover about ourselves. This hybrid approach is designed to contextualise self-knowledge within a broader project of ongoing self-constitution