At the present time the Individual Coercion Doctrine appears strengthened by the Third Circuit\u27s ruling in Ungar and the Supreme Court\u27s denial of certiorari in that case. Nevertheless, detailed analysis of the Doctrine demonstrates that despite the Doctrine\u27s rather lengthy development, it is inconsistent with the basic legal principles of the law of tying as well as the more general purposes of the antitrust laws. The courts should again undertake a critical analysis of the Doctrine and, as the district court did in Ungar, remove coercion as an independent requirement of tying law.Perhaps in the near future as a result of the present split in the circuit courts of appeals, the Supreme Court itself will make a definitive statement...
The Second Circuit, in the noted case, delineated the policy considerations in deciding whether to p...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).For more than one hundred years, American antitrust laws h...
The U.S. Supreme Court has employed the per se standard for illegality of tying arrangements under a...
Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treatment from the Supreme Court as tying arran...
The role which the private litigant plays in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, either by an act...
The Supreme Court\u27s treatment of tying arrangements has long been based on an economic theory tha...
In antitrust law, the conclusion that tying the sale of a second product to a patented product is au...
Notwithstanding hundreds of court decisions, tying arrangements remain enigmatic. Conclusions that g...
With the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach and its emphasis on competitive prices and o...
Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm....
This paper provides an overview of the law and the antitrust economics of tying. After describing th...
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes [e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restra...
The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Theref...
Tying arrangements have been controversial and regarded with suspicion for a long time both within t...
The Second Circuit, in the noted case, delineated the policy considerations in deciding whether to p...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).For more than one hundred years, American antitrust laws h...
The U.S. Supreme Court has employed the per se standard for illegality of tying arrangements under a...
Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treatment from the Supreme Court as tying arran...
The role which the private litigant plays in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, either by an act...
The Supreme Court\u27s treatment of tying arrangements has long been based on an economic theory tha...
In antitrust law, the conclusion that tying the sale of a second product to a patented product is au...
Notwithstanding hundreds of court decisions, tying arrangements remain enigmatic. Conclusions that g...
With the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach and its emphasis on competitive prices and o...
Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm....
This paper provides an overview of the law and the antitrust economics of tying. After describing th...
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes [e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restra...
The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Theref...
Tying arrangements have been controversial and regarded with suspicion for a long time both within t...
The Second Circuit, in the noted case, delineated the policy considerations in deciding whether to p...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).For more than one hundred years, American antitrust laws h...