Philosophy

Making Space for the Birds of the Aviary: How Plato\u27s Conception Models-the Wax Block theory and the Aviary-Prove Useful in Describing the Acquisition of Knowledge and the Formation of False Beliefs - Two of Plato\u27s conceptual models\u27 put forth in the Theaetetus-the Wax Block theory and the Aviary-contribute significant insights as to how an obfuscated perceptual experience (e.g. seeing someone at a distance) can mislead you into forming a false belief. Plato, nevertheless, dismissed these models on the grounds that they fail to explain how you can form false beliefs where perception is not involved. How is it possible, Plato inquires, to wrongly believe that the sum of 5 and 7 equals 11 given that you have knowledge of both 5 and 7? [196a]. In other words, how can two \u27pieces of knowledge\u27 (i.e. the knowledge of 5 and 7) themselves produce a false belief? Despite these concerns, however, I argue that on Plato\u27s own account of knowledge it is possible to form false beliefs even in cases where no perceptual experience is involved. Namely, three ways in which false beliefs can arise independently of any perceptual experience are by: 1) erroneously believing that something you see (or hear) is something else you know, 2) erroneously believing that something you know is another thing that you know, and 3) erroneously believing that something you thought is something else that you know. It is, in all three cases, your haste or eagerness to align a perception, thought, or piece of knowledge with something else that you know that is ultimately responsible for the false belief. ; Placing the Good in Plato\u27s Republic - This project examines who within Plato\u27s just city is most prepared to govern. In the Republic, Plato argues that rulers must have knowledge of Justice and the Good to be able to actualize a truly just city. He concludes that philosophers must therefore rule the just city because only they are naturally able to obtain this necessary knowledge. But in the Theaetetus, Socrates describes these philosophers as inexperienced in the political sphere of the unjust city and significantly underprepared to bring about the just city. They have solely been pursuing knowledge but are not prepared to apply this knowledge and establish justice. To resolve these two contradictory accounts of the philosopher in the city, I argue that knowledge of the Good is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish and maintain the just city. A true belief of the Good and experience in how to apply the Good to the city is what is needed. In the Theaetetus, we see that a superior adviser raised in the political sphere of the city may draw upon their experience of seeing what has secured good things for the city to develop a true belief of the Good. The adviser then uses their true belief as their guide when creating the just city. They do not have knowledge of the Good, but are the most prepared to apply the truth of what is Good to the political sphere and bring the city to be in highest accordance with the Form of the Good.; Plato on Knowledge in the Meno and the Theaetetus - In Plato\u27s Theaetetus Socrates asks the title character to give a definition of knowledge. The dialogue examines three possible definitions of knowledge, but none of them work. So that at the end of the dialogue we are still left wondering what is knowledge. What is going on? In my paper I argue that it is not that Plato does not know the answer to what knowledge is, but rather that he is unable to provide a definition of knowledge that sufficiently differentiates it from true belief. The beginning of my paper looks at the Meno, another Platonic dialogue about knowledge. In the Meno, Socrates claims that the content of both true belief and knowledge are the same. Knowledge is just true belief that has been tied down. The puzzle that we are left with at the end of the Meno, concerns how we can ever tell the difference between true belief and knowledge. In other words, how can I tell whether my conviction that 2+2=4 is a true belief or genuine knowledge? What we discover in the Theaetetus is that there is no way to properly define what it means to tie something down, and so knowledge and true belief, although conceptually different, are indistinguishable through experience. ; Portrait of a Philosopher: Defining Philosophy and Philosophers in the Theaetetus - Socrates, as understood through his student Plato\u27s writings, has long served as a model for all Western philosophers. Despite this common characterization, it is not clear that Socrates can be considered a philosopher by Plato\u27s own definition. In the Theaetetus there is a clear tension between how Socrates presents himself and how Plato describes the capabilities and characteristics of philosophers. In this paper, I examine both Socrates and the Philosopher, as described in the Theaetetus, and show that no individual, including Socrates, as he is presented in the dialogue, can be considered a Philosopher. I then argue that Socrates is instead representative of one specific faculty of a philosopher, and that with the right interlocutor the act of Socratic dialogue itself is the best - or perhaps only - true way to perform Platonic Philosophy