Does politics drive conflict in central banks\u2019 committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus

This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers\u2019 position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank\u2019s projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong