A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios systematically face higher spreads and more stringent borrowing constraints than others with far higher debt ratios. Earlier research has rationalized the phenomenon in terms of sovereign reputation and countries’ distinct credit histories. This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence to show that differences in underlying macroeconomic volatility are key. While volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic consumption, the ability to borrow is constrained by the higher default risk that volatility engenders
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios s...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debtto-income ratios sy...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios s...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debtto-income ratios sy...
The costs of debt crises are not invariant to the foreign debt instrument composition: bank loans or...
While the relationship between volatility and credit risk is central to much of the literature on fi...
In several economies, household debt had risen substantially prior to the financial crisis, and the ...
There has been a growing concern about the vulnerability of emerging countries to fluc-tuations in i...
This paper introduces the concept of “debt intolerance,” which manifests itself in the extreme dures...
In this paper we argue that history matters: that a country’s record at meeting its debt obligations...
This paper introduces the concept of “debt intolerance,” which manifests itself in the extreme dures...
International audienceBulow and Rogoff (Am Econ Rev 79(1):43–50, 1989) show that lending to small co...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios s...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debtto-income ratios sy...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios s...
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debtto-income ratios sy...
The costs of debt crises are not invariant to the foreign debt instrument composition: bank loans or...
While the relationship between volatility and credit risk is central to much of the literature on fi...
In several economies, household debt had risen substantially prior to the financial crisis, and the ...
There has been a growing concern about the vulnerability of emerging countries to fluc-tuations in i...
This paper introduces the concept of “debt intolerance,” which manifests itself in the extreme dures...
In this paper we argue that history matters: that a country’s record at meeting its debt obligations...
This paper introduces the concept of “debt intolerance,” which manifests itself in the extreme dures...
International audienceBulow and Rogoff (Am Econ Rev 79(1):43–50, 1989) show that lending to small co...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...
Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the syndrome of “debt intolera...