Decentralized Ride-Sharing and Vehicle-Pooling Based on Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Ride-sharing or vehicle-pooling allows commuters to team up spontaneously for transportation cost sharing. This has become a popular trend in the emerging paradigm of sharing economy. One crucial component to support effective ride-sharing is the matching mechanism that pairs up suitable commuters. Traditionally, matching has been performed in a centralized manner, whereby an operator arranges ride-sharing according to a global objective (e.g., total cost of all commuters). However, ride-sharing is a decentralized decision-making paradigm, where commuters are self-interested and only motivated to team up based on individual payments. Particularly, it is not clear how transportation cost should be shared fairly between commuters, and what ramifications of cost-sharing are on decentralized ride-sharing. This paper sheds light on the principles of decentralized ride-sharing and vehicle-pooling mechanisms based on stable matching, such that no one would be better off to deviate from a stable matching outcome. We study various fair cost-sharing mechanisms and the induced stable matching outcomes. We compare the stable matching outcomes with a social optimal outcome (that minimizes total cost) by theoretical bounds of social optimality ratios, and show that several fair cost-sharing mechanisms can achieve high social optimality. We also corroborate our results with an empirical study of taxi sharing under fair cost-sharing mechanisms by a data analysis on New York City taxi trip dataset, and provide useful insights on effective decentralized mechanisms for practical ride-sharing and vehicle-pooling.Comment: To appear in IEEE Trans. on Intelligent Transportation System