F. Nietzsche: the will to power principle

Straipsnyje siekiama išnagrinėti F. Nietzsche‘s „valios siekti galios“ principu grindžiamos filosofijos prigimtį, parodyti šios filosofijos ypatumus, lyginant ją su metafizine ir pozityvistine laikysenomis, „valios siekti galios“ sukeliamą novatoriškumą, sietiną su „perspektyvistinio (interpretacinio) patinimo“ samprata, išryškinti būdingiausius ir neįprastus šios sampratos bruotus, lyginant ją su tradicine tiesos patinimo problematika. Siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, ar „valia siekti galios“ gali būti laikoma substancija tradicine šios sąvokos prasme? Ryškinant šio principo prigimtį pabrėžiama, kad jis numato ne tapatybę, bet skirtį. Skirtį gimdanti ir šioje skirtyje gimstanti „valia siekti galios“ funkcionuoja svarstant moralės kilmę. Kartu keliamas uždavinys parodyti, kad „valios siekti galios“ principu grįstas ir moralės kilmės svarstymas, kuris, beje, kaip ir kiekvienas kitas svarstymas, tegali būti tik interpretatyvus, t. y. negalintis pretenduoti į vieną universalią tiesą, į vieną visiems privalomą normatyvumą.Article deals with Nietzsche's philosophy as a radical critique of the classical thinking paradigm. Nietzsche used the will to power concept to separate himself from the dualism of classical thinking and especially from A. Schopenhauer's concept of the "will to live", which leads to passivity. The category of "life" for Nietzsche does not mean inactive seclusion, but activity: possessing, subduing the weaker dominance of individual shapes, annexation. So the will to power was built on a dynamic, antagonistic foundation. The will to power in Nietzsche's thinking is not a "thing in itself", as opposed to "phenomenon" (E. Kant), or else "a will" as opposed to "an image" (A. Schopenhauer). It is inseparable from its realisation, similarly as lightning is inseparable from its luminescence. The will to power decides upon an approach which allows no substance of "will" outside of phenomenon or existence of "an object in itself"; it is an approach that does not accept any "facts in the mitselves", only interpretations. Therefore, Nietzsche's philosophy holds many associations with the postmodern paradigm that allows only an interpretative understanding of the world, i. e., understanding that creates only an interpretation of the interpretation. There is no absolute primordiality which would lend itself to interpretation, because anything can be the basis for interpretation. Therefore, "the will to power", as non-substance, is inseparable from the basis of self-demonstration and, in the long run, is only an interpretation and an interpretation of the interpretation, i. e., a phenomenalistic understanding of the world. The essence of this phenomenalistic understanding is that the world which we are capable of appropriating is only surface, generalized by oversimplified signs. It accepts only total appearance (Scheinbare). The will to power is inseparable from realisations which take place through the agency of two different types of forces: active and reactive. It indicates the difference between the forces and also is manifest in this "difference". The will to power foresees not identity but difference, it shows, determines and manifests difference. With respect to the genesis of power or its generation, the will to power determines the relation between forces, but in its own turn is determined by the activity of these forces. [...