This chapter discusses how we should think about experiences that threaten to radically transform our understanding of the world. While it can be rational to treat the “doxastically transformative” potential of an experience as a reason to choose against it, such a decision must be based in something more than the fact that this experience would alter one’s current beliefs. It only in light of knowledge of how things are that a person can choose rationally against transformative processes that would destroy this knowledge
If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically varia...
The problem I want to discuss has to do with believing as distinct from perceiving, imagining, posit...
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance fr...
A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the ...
We can differ in our beliefs, values, interests, goals, preferences and moral psychologies. How we s...
The question of coming to faith, and leaving Christian faith, has become prominent in recent years, ...
In this paper I’ll suggest that a certain challenge facing defeatist views about higher order eviden...
According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ...
Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions whi...
People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixati...
Chapter One of this dissertation examines the scope of the epistemic imperative to pursue accurate b...
ABSTRACT. In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a be...
I investigate when we can (rationally) have attitudes, and when we cannot. I argue that a comprehens...
My dissertation maintains that people cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that propos...
If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically varia...
The problem I want to discuss has to do with believing as distinct from perceiving, imagining, posit...
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance fr...
A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the ...
We can differ in our beliefs, values, interests, goals, preferences and moral psychologies. How we s...
The question of coming to faith, and leaving Christian faith, has become prominent in recent years, ...
In this paper I’ll suggest that a certain challenge facing defeatist views about higher order eviden...
According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ...
Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions whi...
People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixati...
Chapter One of this dissertation examines the scope of the epistemic imperative to pursue accurate b...
ABSTRACT. In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a be...
I investigate when we can (rationally) have attitudes, and when we cannot. I argue that a comprehens...
My dissertation maintains that people cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that propos...
If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically varia...
The problem I want to discuss has to do with believing as distinct from perceiving, imagining, posit...
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance fr...