Add to ORKGThis paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in shaping what actions become habitual for us
This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the...
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but ar...
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s put...
This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variet...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
An action is typically carried out over time, unified by an intention that is known to the agent und...
Habitual behaviours are elicited when a familiar context activates cue-behaviour associations that h...
Habit is often treated as a construct of marginal interest in the literature on attitude-behaviour r...
Habits form a crucial part of the everyday conceptual scheme used to explain normal human activity. ...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of ...
Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicit...
Objective. The objective of the current study was to examine the cognitive processes that make it po...
We are creatures of habit. Familiar ways of doing things in familiar contexts become automatic for ...
Abstract Background Social cognitive theories on behaviour change are increasingly being used to und...
The paper addresses the question of how to approach consciousness in unreflective actions. Unreflect...
This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the...
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but ar...
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s put...
This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variet...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
An action is typically carried out over time, unified by an intention that is known to the agent und...
Habitual behaviours are elicited when a familiar context activates cue-behaviour associations that h...
Habit is often treated as a construct of marginal interest in the literature on attitude-behaviour r...
Habits form a crucial part of the everyday conceptual scheme used to explain normal human activity. ...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of ...
Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicit...
Objective. The objective of the current study was to examine the cognitive processes that make it po...
We are creatures of habit. Familiar ways of doing things in familiar contexts become automatic for ...
Abstract Background Social cognitive theories on behaviour change are increasingly being used to und...
The paper addresses the question of how to approach consciousness in unreflective actions. Unreflect...
This study tested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the...
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but ar...
From time to time we explain what people do by referring to their habits. We explain somebody’s put...