Norm violation versus punishment risk in a social model of corruption

We analyze the onset of social-norm-violating behaviors when social punishment is present. To this aim, a compartmental model is introduced to illustrate the flows among the three possible states: Honest, corrupt, and ostracism. With this simple model we attempt to capture some essential ingredients such as the contagion of corrupt behaviors to honest agents, the delation of corrupt individuals by honest ones, and the warning to wrongdoers (fear like that triggers the conversion of corrupt people into honesty). In nonequilibrium statistical physics terms, the former dynamics can be viewed as a non-Hamiltonian kinetic spin-1 Ising model. After developing in full detail its mean-field theory and comparing its predictions with simulations made on regular networks, we derive the conditions for the emergence of corrupt behaviors and, more importantly, illustrate the key role of the warning-to-wrongdoers mechanism in the latter