Moral Hazard:Insufficiency of Reinsurance Supply in China

保险领域的道德风险,不仅发生在直接保险交易中,而且也发生在再保险交易中。道德风险的产生,减少了再保险供给的数量,降低了再保险合同双方的效用水平。文章从量化我国财产保险再保险供给不足入手,指出我国再保险供给不足这一现状,通过介绍道德风险存在引起再保险供给不足的模型,提出对我国再保险交易道德风险防范的控制措施。In the field of insurance,moral hazards occur not only in direct insurance transactions,but also in reinsurance transactions.The moral hazards cause the decrease of the reinsurance supply and reduce the utilities of insurer and reinsurer.From the measured Chinese non-life reinsurance supply,the insufficiency of Chinese reinsurance supply is pointed out.By introducing the modal of how moral hazards reduce the reinsurance supply,some precautions and control measures in reinsurance are put forward